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ABSTRACT 
The role of local and external institutions in natural resource management (NRM) is 
gaining attention in the literature, fostering greater understanding of the 
relationship between collective action and poverty, collective action and equity, and 
the conditions under which collective action institutions take root. It has also led to 
increased understanding of how uncritical practices by external development 
institutions can propagate social inequities in NRM. Yet little research has been 
conducted to understand how to foster local collective action institutions where they 
are absent, or to improve institutional practice. This research integrates empirical 
and action research in an effort to generate working solutions to problems facing 
rural communities in their efforts to manage their natural resources in the 
highlands of Ethiopia and Uganda. Following a brief introduction to the literature 
and the research, findings are presented according to two distinct phases of 
research. Data are first presented on existing forms of collective action, the 
influence of local and external institutions on economic development, and NRM 
problems that persist despite their negative livelihood consequences. Action 
research themes selected from a list of identified problems are then presented in 
greater detail, with lessons learnt thus far in attempting to overcome institutional 
barriers to improved NRM. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications 
of findings for research, institutional practice, and policy.   
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AFRICAN HIGHLANDS 
Laura German,
1 Waga Mazengia, Wilberforce Tirwomwe, Shenkut Ayele, Joseph 
Tanui, Simon Nyangas, Leulseged Begashaw, Hailemichael Taye, Zenebe Admassu, 
Mesfin Tsegaye, Francis Alinyo, Ashenafi Mekonnen, Kassahun Aberra, Awadh 
Chemangei, William Cheptegei, Tessema Tolera, Zewude Jote, and Kiflu Bedane 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite an increased awareness of the institutional foundations of development and 
natural resource management, development interventions continue to have a 
strong technological bias. Development and conservation interventions continue to 
be carried out with an uncritical view to equity and possible negative repercussions 
on certain social groups and to environmental sustainability, while local institutions 
(rules and structures) remain largely invisible to outside actors. Yet, the 
shortcomings lie not only with practitioners, but within research. Research on the 
institutional dimensions of development and NRM continues to emphasize problems 
rather than solutions. This research sought to address these shortcomings by 
integrating institutional analysis (for problem identification and targeting of 
interventions) with institutional interventions (for development of good practice). 
Our findings suggest that action research on the institutional foundations of 
development and NRM is a fertile ground for research in support of practical 
development challenges. 
This research is relevant for policy for several reasons. First, development 
actors tend to ignore local institutions and their role in livelihoods, preferring 
instead to set up new structures—representing both a lost opportunity as well as 
marginalizing local institutions that work. Secondly, research and development 
organizations focus on individual over collective decision-making, often leading to 
solutions that bring benefits to some groups at the expense of others, either 
because others do not access benefits, or because actions taken by some 
individuals have a negative impact on others. Finally, for the full potential of 
collective action to be realized in development and natural resource management, 
reforms in institutional practice and local policies are needed. This requires political 
commitment to equity in the ways in which development organizations interface 
with local communities and national policies translate to local-level practices, and to 
bottom-up policy reforms that can give extra weight to local agreements. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Collective action in natural resource management 
The role of collective action in agricultural development and natural resource 
management is by now well documented. Scholars have looked at the role of 
collective action in enhancing farmer participation and human capital (Coleman, 
1988; Heinrich, 1993; Uphoff and Mijayaratna, 2000; Woolock and Narayan, 2000); 
determinants and operational principles of collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Pandey 
and Yadama, 1990; Wittapayak and Dearden, 1999); and the conditions under 
which collective action can be a vehicle for enhancing equity in natural resource 
management (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1995; Leach et al., 1999; Molyneux, 2002). 
Yet the bulk of research on collective action is in the context of common property 
resources (Gebremedhin et al., 2002; Munk Ravnborg and Ashby, 1996; Ostrom 
1990; Scott and Silva-Ochoa, 2001). 
Collective action is also a fundamental pillar of landscape or watershed-level 
natural resource management. In addition to regulating rights and responsibilities 
to common property resources and public goods (Gaspart et al,. 1998; Ostrom, 
1990), collective action has a role to play in managing biophysical processes that 
cut across farm boundaries (Munk Ravnborg et al., 2000). Collective action can also 
play a role in negotiating joint investments and technological innovations for 
enhanced productivity, regulating the distribution of exogenous resources within 
local communities (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002) and negotiating solutions which 
optimize returns to diverse local interest groups (German et al., 2006a, 2006b). 
Given the sheer number of users in watersheds, the transaction costs of organizing 
and the tendency for outside interventions to structure positions of privilege vis-à-
vis any given resource (Munk Ravnborg and Ashby, 1996; Schroeder, 1993), 
representative structures and mechanisms for structuring the interface of outside 
actors with local communities are needed (German et al., 2006b). This is in 
recognition of the inherently political nature of natural resource management 
(Rocheleau and Edmunds, 1997; Schroeder, 1993), which requires that the 
outcomes and distribution of benefits of watershed management and related project 
interventions be transparently negotiated and monitored.  
In addition to understanding what collective action can achieve, research has 
highlighted some of the conditions under which institutions of collective action for 
NRM emerge. These include the presence of clearly defined rules for resource 
management and access (including sanctions), a clear definition of members and 
boundaries of the resource, adaptive management mechanisms (monitoring 
systems, ability to modify rules as the need arises), conflict resolution mechanisms, 
and a manageable size of the user group and the resource (Ostrom, 1990; Pandey 
and Yadama, 1990; Wittapayak and Dearden, 1999). Each of these factors plays an 
important role in influencing levels of mutual trust as well as expectations of what 
may be gained through cooperation (Blau, 1964; Burns et al., 1985). Yet, key gaps 
in our understanding remain on how to facilitate the evolution of institutions of 
collective action where these are absent. More research is needed to understand 
how equitable, meaningful (well-designed and enforceable), yet flexible, rules can 
be generated, and how to mobilize existing or new capacities for participatory 
governance of natural resources (Carney, 1998; Scoones and Thompson, 2003). 3 
Collective action, institutions and equity 
Through their role in structuring access to other forms of capital (natural, financial, 
physical, and human), local and external institutions alike play an important role in 
structuring opportunities and benefits capture. Research has shown that collective 
action can contribute to asset accumulation or protect households from loss of 
assets through their ability to mitigate risks. These functions may play out directly, 
by improving people’s ability to work together to overcome limitations of wealth, 
farm size, and bargaining power (di Gregorio et al., 2004), and to access and 
control assets that could be difficult to access individually (Knox et al., 2002; de 
Haan, 2001). For example, joint input or output marketing can enhance market 
access or improve profit by minimizing transaction costs (Place et al., 2002). 
Collective action also plays an indirect role by facilitating access to credit and 
micro-financing, information, and technologies (Grootaert, 1999; Knox et al, 2002; 
Valdivia and Gilles, 2001). Each of these functions has implications for assets 
creation. On the other hand, collective action can help to minimize loss of assets 
during times of hardship by distributing risk among households, for example, by 
mobilizing resources during times of illness or death. Collective action thus helps 
individuals to better cope with risk and provides a safety net function that neither 
the government nor private sector is able to offer in most places (Place et al., 
2002; de Haan, 2001).  
In addition to contributing to financial capital, collective action has also been 
shown to underpin service delivery for infrastructure and social services (Nitti and 
Jahiya, 2004). Action research findings are also pointing to the role of collective 
action and diverse forms of social capital in enhancing human capital and spreading 
transaction costs of improved NRM (Coleman, 1988; Heinrich, 1993; Meinzen-Dick 
et al., 2002; Uphoff and Mijayaratna, 2000; Wallis, 1998; Woolock and Narayan, 
2000). Yet, despite the potential of collective action for enhancing access to other 
important development resources, group composition, dynamics, and governance 
are fundamental for these potentials to be realized (Davis et al., 2004). This is 
especially true for managing the distribution of benefits from such interventions 
(Grootaert, 2002; Jassey, 2000; Molyneaux, 2002). Therefore, the relationship 
between collective action and equity depends in large part on the functions and 
capacities under which these forms of social capital operate. 
External institutions also have a fundamental role to play in agricultural 
development and sustainable natural resource management. Yet all too often, 
uncritical development interventions by government and NGOs have led to a host of 
unanticipated negative outcomes due to failure to understand existing institutions. 
Failure to recognize self-organizing local institutions in the management of common 
property resources and imposition of overly rigid property rights regimes on 
traditional systems have proven to constrain, rather than enable equitable, 
adaptive and sustainable management of natural resources (Bloch, 1993; Davison, 
1988; Kevane and Gray, 1999; Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; McDonald, 1991; Munk 
Ravnborg and Ashby, 1996; Nemarundwe and Kozanayi, 2003; Ostrom, 1999). 
Other authors document how outside interventions can increase risk due to more 
delimited resource access (Ngaido and Kirk, 2001; Turner, 1999). Finally, some 
interventions have proven to further entrench existing inequities by creating the 
conditions for elite capture of program benefits or natural resources (Rocheleau and 
Edmunds, 1997; Schroeder, 1993).  4 
Despite these deficiencies, if outside interventions can influence the 
distribution of power and voice, there is potential for realigning the distribution of 
technologies, resources, and benefits (Knox et al., 2002). Such efforts could help to 
counter the tendency of extension benefits to go to wealthier farmers (Knox et al., 
2002; Grabowski, 1990) or the causal role played by wealth in structuring resource 
access (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). Given the context of decentralization and 
devolution of policy structures in Uganda, Ethiopia and elsewhere (Raussen et al., 
2001), and evidence of elite capture from similar experiences at the local level 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Munk Ravnborg and Ashby, 1996; Olson, 2001), 
lessons on how to engage and empower more vulnerable groups are sorely needed. 
This is particularly true given the many, often discrete, ways in which elite 
dominance can be asserted (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). These cases point to the 
need for a better understanding of the ways in which external institutions facilitate 
wealth acquisition by different social groups and of strategies to foster more 
equitable outcomes from external interventions.  
Program context 
This research was conducted under the rubric of the African Highlands Initiative 
(AHI), an ecoregional program of the CGIAR and ASARECA
2 convened by the World 
Agroforestry Centre. The program’s aim is to improve livelihoods and arrest natural 
resource degradation in the intensively cultivated highlands of eastern and central 
Africa. AHI works in a collaborative mode with interdisciplinary teams of scientists 
from National Agricultural Research and Extension Systems (NARES) and 
development partners in benchmark sites, where new approaches are field-tested 
and experiences synthesized regionally. These benchmark sites were chosen based 
on: high population densities, clear signs of natural resource degradation, and 
representativeness of the site to larger highland areas within each country (for 
subsequent application of lessons learned). 
Since 2002, AHI has worked to develop a participatory, integrated approach 
to NRM at landscape / watershed scale. Different from many other watershed 
management programs focusing primarily on soil and water conservation, AHI is 
fostering an approach to integrate all components of the production system (crop, 
livestock, tree, and soil) and landscape (encompassing common property resources 
such as water, communal grazing lands, and forests). This requires that trade-offs 
and synergies between diverse goals be made explicit and managed, including 
income generation with conservation; production of crops, trees and livestock; and 
biomass increases with nutrient and water conservation. It also must acknowledge 
that natural resource management is inherently political, with decisions about which 
management goals to foster leading to unequal benefits and often favoring some 
groups at the expense of others. The concept of participation must move beyond 
numbers of participants in community events to acknowledge these dynamics and 
foster greater equity in voices, choices, and benefits. This paper reports on findings 
from the institutional research associated with integrated social, biophysical, and 
institutional interventions. The primary objective of this research was to develop 
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and document successful approaches for facilitating equitable collective action 
processes and negotiated natural resource management solutions. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Research questions 
Empirical Research: 
1.  What is the role of existing institutions (groups, rules and norms, property 
rights, decentralization systems) in leveraging or constraining decision-
making and resource access by diverse groups?  
2.  What contextual factors (institutional, policy, historical, contested 
knowledge) hinder collective action and exacerbate poverty through 
inequitable decision-making and access to natural resources in the each 
site? 
3.  What are the impacts of action research interventions on participation in 
decision-making processes, identified watershed problems, policies, and 
resulting livelihoods/assets of diverse groups? 
Action Research: 
1.  What conditions (social, technological, policy, economic) and facilitation 
processes are required to enhance socially-optimal voices (decision-
making), choices (technological, social, and income options) and benefits 
(poverty alleviation, improved management, and access to natural 
resources)? 
2.  What policies, by-laws, and support from local government are required 
to bolster community actions and collective action toward more effective 
and equitable NRM and income generation? What are the most effective 
approaches for engaging communities with local government and service 
providers to achieve these policy reforms?  
Hypotheses 
1.  Strategies to improve natural resource management at farm and 
landscape levels will be more effective if decision-making on technologies 
and natural resource governance is equitable, given the broad social 
support required to sustain collective action.  
2.  Increased capacity to develop better designed and more equitable by-laws 
will improve livelihoods by enabling technology adoption, enhancing 
collective action in natural resource management, and reducing the need 
for bylaw enforcement.  6 
METHODOLOGY 
Site selection 
Four sites were chosen for this research—two in Ethiopia and two in Uganda. All 
sites are highland micro-watersheds characterized by smallholder farming systems, 
high population density and evidence of natural resource degradation. These sites 
have each served for 5 to 10 years as benchmark sites for the African Highlands 
Initiative, where new approaches to integrated natural resource management are 
first developed and tested, and from which regional lessons are drawn from 
comparative research. Each site is home to one or more ethnic groups with a long 
history of occupation of the area and limited in-migration from other groups or 
areas. Despite some similarities, each site has unique characteristics that merit 
attention in the context of collective action and NRM. 
Areka Site 
The Areka site is located in the Wolaita region of south-central Ethiopia. The area is 
a mixed crop-livestock system with a high diversity of staple and cash crops (enset, 
wheat, maize, barley, sorghum, sweet potato, Irish potato, faba bean, field pea, 
and horticultural crops). Livestock are grazed in a large communal grazing area or 
in semi-communal fenced plots. Despite the diversity of enterprises characterizing 
the system, landholdings are extremely small (.74 and .26 hectares on average for 
high and low wealth categories, respectively), and the area is subject to chronic 
food deficits. Unique to this site are a large number of landless families who earn a 
living as sharecroppers or through petty trade. 
Key NRM challenges in this site include: a) enhancing the productivity and 
returns from crop, livestock, and tree components without further exacerbating 
system nutrient decline; b) arresting water resource degradation and resource 
conflicts through more optimal land management practices and improved 
governance; and c) increasing the viability of agriculture (through intensification 
and value addition) as a pathway to food security. 
Ginchi Site 
The Ginchi Benchmark Site is located in Western Shewa Zone, Ethiopia, home to 
the Oromo ethnic group. It is a mixed crop-livestock system that is more 
extensively managed than other sites. The system is very limited in biomass. 
Indiscriminate cutting of remnant trees and contiguous forest stemming largely 
from regime change and the resulting ambiguity in tenure systems (Bekele, 2003), 
and failure to invest in NRM practices with delayed returns due to perceived tenure 
insecurity have contributed to large areas of landscape devoid of vegetation and 
with very low nutrient stocks. This has placed increased burden on women and 
children who must walk long distances to gather fire wood, and has caused 
negative impacts on soil nutrients due to the sharp increase in the use of dung for 
fuel in recent decades (Omiti et al., 1999). Loss of tree cover and cultivation of 
Eucalyptus around springs have led to the degradation of springs, the sole source of 
water for both humans and livestock. Yet, the tendency for humans and livestock to 
share common watering points has made water quality more of a concern than 
water quantity in the minds of local residents.  7 
High-value crops like Irish potato and garlic are grown on fenced homestead 
plots, while extensive outfield areas are used almost exclusively for barley 
production. Valley bottoms are used exclusively for livestock grazing. While all land 
is officially owned by the government, individuals have de facto ownership over all 
land in the watershed. Yet management is collective in certain spatial and temporal 
niches. Households own outfield areas on both sides of the catchment, cultivating 
one side of the catchment and leaving the other side for grazing during the rainy 
season. The side of the catchment that is left for grazing is done so by all 
households with contiguous plots, enabling free movement of livestock by those 
households owning land in the area. Valley bottoms are grazed year-round, with 
access during the cropping season restricted to those households owning plots of 
land in these areas. During the dry season, outfields and valley bottoms are open 
access resources. This scenario makes systems innovation very challenging, 
requiring collective action not only among households living within the watershed 
but involving others who graze their livestock in the area.  
The key challenges for integrated NRM include: a) intensifying production (of 
crops, livestock and trees) while ensuring sustainable nutrient management in the 
system; and b) reversing water resource degradation by fostering positive 
synergies between trees, soil conservation structures and water in micro-
catchments. Furthermore, seasonal open access grazing makes investments in 
afforestation and soil conservation structures in the outfields challenging as cattle 
can easily destroy such investments. Site teams and local leaders have highlighted 
this as a key challenge for this site, and targeted local negotiations and integrated 
policy and technological innovations as avenues for innovation.  
Kabale Site 
The Kabale benchmark site is located in Kigezi highlands of southwestern Uganda, 
home to the Bakiga ethnic group. The area is characterized by high population 
densities, steep cultivated slopes, fragmented landholdings, land shortages, and 
adequate rainfall. This site is also a mixed crop-livestock system with a relatively 
small livestock component. Communal grazing areas are negligible, making zero 
grazing a necessity and free grazing—where it does occur—a source of conflict due 
to damages incurred to crops. In addition to limited numbers of livestock, 
enterprises include Irish potatoes and vegetable crops in the valley bottoms, and 
cereals (sorghum, maize, wheat, and finger millet), pulses, and bananas on the 
hillsides. Trees are few and declining in number, a trend which has been 
exacerbated in recent years as a result of a high demands from a nearby gin 
distillery.  
 Key NRM challenges in this site include: a) integrating technological 
innovation with improved natural resource governance to minimize the incidence of 
conflict emanating from small landholdings, limited economic opportunities, and 
gender inequalities; b) improving incomes from small and fragmented landholdings 
through soil fertility management, diversification, and value addition; and c) 
managing the dependency syndrome, acute in this site due to a high density of 
NGOs and CBOs with short-sighted support strategies. 8 
Kapchorwa Site 
Kapchorwa District is located on the slopes of Mt Elgon in eastern Uganda. The 
district has a total population of 193,510 as per the 2002 population and housing 
census. The district population growth rate is at 4.33 percent, which is high 
compared to the national average of 3.3 percent. The district has three ecological 
zones: lowlands (33 percent), which are almost deserted due to insecurity caused 
by cattle rustling; highlands (34 percent), which are heavily settled and cultivated; 
and forest (33 percent), which is a protected area. Agriculture is the main economic 
activity, engaging over 82.1 percent of the working population. The primary crops 
are maize, bananas, coffee, beans, wheat, barley, sunflower and vegetable crops, 
with 82.1 percent of households living from farming.  
The district is also home to the Mount Elgon National Park, established as a 
Crown Forest in 1930. Management of the area within and surrounding the park has 
been subject to the whims of shifting government policies on forest management, 
changes which have affected most severely the native Benet who have occupied the 
moorlands inside the park for the last 200 years. These changes have also 
negatively affected conservation in the area, as park officials and local residents 
alike have exploited the loosely guarded protected area under the current land 
tenure arrangement and the ambiguity of rights to adjacent communities. 
Key challenges include equitable resource access given histories of ethnic 
conflict (cattle raiding); managing resources sustainably within and in the buffer 
zone of the national park given the history of displacement and conflict; and limited 
quality and access to support services due to a sparse NGO presence, limited 
coordination among sectors, and weak civil society.  
Research methods 
The methodology consisted of four primary steps: 
Situation Analysis 
The situation analysis used an empirical research approach to understand: (i) how 
resources are distributed within communities; and (ii) the role of internal and 
external institutions in enhancing or constraining resource access and decision-
making by diverse groups. The situation analysis consisted of two primary methods. 
Focus group discussions were first utilized to identify local and external institutions 
and the participants, beneficiaries, and nature of benefits derived from each. The 
second step consisted in household interviews to quantify levels and variation in 
household assets (the five capitals) by gender and wealth, and participation or 
involvement with local and external institutions (assessed as one component of 
social capital). In each site, at least sixty household interviews were conducted. 
Households were purposively sampled by gender (men, women from female-
headed households, and women from male-headed households) and wealth (based 
on local indicators and thresholds).  
Stakeholder Workshops 
Following the situation analysis, site and national stakeholder workshops were 
conducted to share findings and agree on action research priorities. Site-level 9 
workshops consisted of: (i) feedback of findings; (ii) identification of NRM issues 
requiring collective action, changes in institutional practice and/or by-law reforms; 
(iii) prioritization of these issues, based on a set of minimal criteria; and (iv) 
development of preliminary action plans for prioritized topics. The screening criteria 
for action research themes included the following: 
1.  Involves change at multiple levels (local, outside institutions, policies); 
2.  Involves current inequities or requires close attention to diverse local 
priorities; 
3.  Can bring some change within 1 ½ years. 
Action Research 
Following stakeholder prioritization of action research themes, site teams developed 
action research protocols to clarify the research questions and facilitation strategies 
to be tested in facilitating local stakeholders to address identified problems. Each 
theme involved two levels of action research:  
1.  Local-level action research on how to foster collective action in natural 
resource management through explicit consideration of diverse views 
when negotiating access to benefits, natural resource management 
strategies, and policy proposals; and 
2.  Higher-level (sub-county/peasant association (PA) or district/woreda) 
action research on how to support equitable collective action processes at 
the local level through changes in institutional practice, policies that 
reflect local priorities, and negotiation support.  
Two to four action research protocols were developed by each team, to 
articulate the Theme of Title of research; the Background/Rationale; action 
research Objectives; the Methodology, emphasizing the process for facilitating 
equitable, negotiated solutions to identified problems; Data to be collected; and an 
Action Plan with a timetable and responsibilities. 
In several sites, most notably Areka and Ginchi, a common strategy was 
tested to foster negotiated solutions to identified NRM problems. This consisted of 
the following steps for each action research theme: 
1.  Identification of stakeholders, with an emphasis on local interest groups; 
2.  Meet with the individual stakeholder groups (individuals who share a 
common position in relation to the issue) to raise awareness, elicit their 
views on the problem and solutions, and their preferred approach to 
engagement;  
3.  Multi-stakeholder negotiations, including:  
a.  Feedback on the identified natural resource management issue and 
meetings with individual stakeholder groups; 
b.  Open dialogue to validate and clarify issues and interests; 
c.  Negotiation of socially-optimal solutions that do not bring harm to 
any given group and emphasizing concessions on both sides, 
including agreed rules for resource management (often in the form 
of formally endorsed by-laws) and technologies which provide 
alternatives to practices restricted in by-laws; and   10 
d.  Action planning. 
4.  Periodic participatory monitoring and evaluation to assess progress, 
troubleshoot, and re-strategize.  
Impact Assessment 
The final step of the research was to evaluate outcomes and impacts from the 
action research intervention as a means to improve the strategy as well as to draw 
general conclusions about the approach used. This was done through a 
participatory methodology where research teams were asked to conduct focus 
group discussions with each stakeholder group to identify local indicators and track 
their performance over time. They were asked to record participant responses in 
detail, noting what was said, who said it, and to use exact wording in the local 
language where possible.  
FINDINGS 
Situation analysis 
Household Assets and Investment Potential 
Household surveys measured current levels of assets using the five capitals: human 
capital (age and education level of household members), social capital (access to 
social networks, participation in local forms of collective action), natural capital 
(water, forest, land, and so on), financial capital (off-farm income, savings) and 
physical capital (roads, structures, transport, communications). The idea behind 
this was to determine: (i) whether current assets determine ability to acquire new 
assets; and (ii) to understand the role of both local forms of collective action and 
outside institutions in asset accumulation. 
Table 1 shows a two- to six-fold increase in land and livestock holdings from 
lower to higher income households. To determine the extent to which wealth begets 
wealth, we analyzed annual levels of investment in productive activities by wealth 
category (Tables 2 and 3). This was used as an indicator of the extent to which 
wealth determines the ability to acquire additional wealth through investment. Data 
suggest a strong correlation between current wealth status and ability to invest in 
productive activities.  
Table 1. Land and livestock assets by wealth category 
Type of Asset  Areka (Ha)  Ginchi (Ha)  Kabale (Acres)  Kapchorwa 
(Acres) 
High Low  High  Low High Low  High  Low 
Landholdings 0.74  0.26  3.4  1.2  7.2  2.0  5.2  0.1 
Heads of Cattle  3.7  0.6  6.4  3.2  0.31  0.15  20.3  1.2 
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Table 2. Agricultural investments by wealth category in Ethiopian sites 
Annual 
Investment 
Ginchi (Birr)  Areka (Birr) 
Low Med High Low Med High 
Seed  336.1 510.9 273.9 72.1  106.8 165.7 
Pesticide  28.3 69.0 48.3 0.6  0.4  0.9 
Fertilizer  133.2 210.7 407.6 46.5  84.9  173.2 
Feed  65.8 170.9  232.5  10.8 20.6 55.0 
Veterinary  23.3 55.1 72.9 9.8  10.5 15.0 
Total 586.7  1,016.6  1,035.2  139.8 223.2 409.8 
Table 3. Agricultural investments by wealth category in Ugandan sites 
Annual 
Investment 
Kabale (Ugandan Shillings)  Kapchorwa (Ugandan 
Shillings) 
Low Med High Low Med High 
Seed  23,640 31,844 72,129 19,980 29,464 42,388 
Pesticide  3,269  7,074  35,059 13,000 20,000 80,714 
Fertilizer 119 279 19,823  1,035  10,963  18,000 
Feed  2,144  11,820 20,882 2,000  76,683 100,000 
Veterinary  226  3,270 7,177 4,666 20,000  86,000 
Total  29,398 54,287 155,070  40,681 157,110  327,102 
Influence of Local and External Institutions on Assets and Livelihoods  
Local collective action institutions were abundant in all research sites. They include 
local savings and loan groups, merry-go-rounds (rotational savings), religious 
associations, funeral associations and stretcher groups, labor sharing arrangements 
for private and communal works, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, saving 
or pooling resources for celebrations, commercial labor groups (Kabale), and land 
and livestock sharing arrangements (Ethiopian sites). Benefits of these institutions 
are both social and economic. Social benefits include strengthened social ties and 
networks and support during periods of hardship while economic benefits include 
access to resources for agricultural and domestic functions (labor, utensils, food, 
seed, cash), and safety net functions. Local institutions were seen almost 
unanimously to benefit all participants. One exception was found in Ethiopia, where 
contracting out land to others is seen as enriching some households (landowners) 
at the expense of others. Yet households continue to practice this activity when 
they have no alternative, generally due to the shortage of inputs (primarily labor).  
While all participants are seen to benefit in most forms of collective action, 
certain participants benefit more than others for some forms of collective action. 
For example, land and livestock sharing arrangements in Ethiopia confer unequal 
benefits to participants. Landowners benefit most in sharecropping because they 
receive the benefits of their land with limited investment, but benefit least in 
contracting because they are paid poorly for the use of their land. Livestock sharing 
arrangements are similarly imbalanced. In Areka, Hara is seen to benefit the cattle 
owner most because they acquire offspring with limited investment, while the 12 
individuals rearing cattle receive only livestock products. In Ginchi, on the other 
hand, Ribi is seen to benefit the poor most, who acquire offspring as well as 
livestock products from cattle owned by others. 
While local forms of collective action are seen to benefit all participants, 
some social groups cannot gain access to certain forms of collective action. 
Resource-poor households, for example, generally cannot participate in savings and 
loan groups, while commercial labor groups are male-dominated. The sick, elderly, 
and disabled seldom participate in local forms of collective action but often receive 
some form of assistance from others. In Kabale, women are more active in local 
forms of collective action, particularly those involving agricultural production.  
Despite the caveats, communities generally agree that local forms of 
collective action play a strong positive role in livelihoods. This function is achieved 
by enabling households to access resources and acquire assets that would have 
otherwise been unachievable, buffering households during shocks and crises, and 
expanding social networks for intra-household sharing and support.  
Collective Action in NRM 
With the exception of labor sharing arrangements, there was a notorious absence of 
collective action for addressing shared natural resource management concerns. 
Many NRM problems requiring collective action therefore remain unsolved. Two 
predominant scenarios were identified that help to explain why NRM problems 
requiring local collective action institutions persist in the eastern African highlands 
despite their negative affect on livelihoods: 
1.  Scenario 1: Natural resource management problems affecting agricultural 
productivity and requiring collective solutions are treated as individual 
problems by the community and by external organizations. 
One example is soil and water conservation. Extension organizations continue 
to work with individual households when promoting soil and water conservation 
technologies, despite the need to foster common drainage ways. No household 
wishes to have common drainage ways pass through their farms because they take 
up agricultural land and excess water can damage crops. The costs and benefits of 
soil and water conservation for farmers residing in upper and lower parts of the 
landscape also differ. Those residing on lower parts of the landscape may benefit 
from the deposition of fertile soil from the upper slopes or be negatively affected by 
excess run-off or deposition of infertile soil. Those residing on upper slopes have 
less of an incentive to invest since their farms less affected by upslope cultivation 
activities. Soil and water conservation activities clearly require negotiated solutions 
to such problems, to facilitate solutions that are not overly harmful to any give land 
user, and to enable the investments of any given household to align with the 
perceived benefits.  
Another example is the control of pests, disease, weeds, and wild animals. 
While traditional forms of collective action for pest and disease control were found 
in Tanzania, most contemporary approaches to pest and disease control emphasize 
control by individual households. Yet the efforts that one household must expend to 
control these problems grossly exceeds the benefits of such efforts, given the 
tendency of farm plots and livestock to be contaminated by adjacent farms and 13 
local livestock populations. Collective action can go a long way in enhancing the 
returns from efforts to control crop and livestock pathogens. 
2.  Scenario 2: Land users emphasize individual economic returns over 
collective goods or collective impacts. 
One example is the cultivation of fast-growing tree species on farm 
boundaries. This a practice benefits the land owner economically, but adversely 
affects the livelihoods of adjacent households given the competition of these trees 
with crops for light, nutrients, and water as well as allelopathic affects associated 
with some tree species. Boundary management practices clearly require negotiated 
solutions that balance the needs of the landowner (income and wood from trees) 
with the concerns of affected households (ability to use their agricultural land to its 
potential). 
A second example involves land management practices that compromise the 
long-term water supply. Problems include heavy siltation of waterways; pollution of 
springs and waterways with detergents, human waste and pesticides; the negative 
effect of certain land use practices on the water supply (for which “thirsty” trees are 
perceived as a major culprit); and levels of consumption of irrigation water. Under 
these scenarios, livelihood improvements of some land users are achieved at the 
expense of other households. Such scenarios clearly require a governance solution 
in which harmful land use practices are regulated according to collective choice 
arrangements. 
Institutional Practice  
Contrary to local institutions, which were generally seen as equitable and 
supportive to most households, the activities of a number of external institutions 
were seen as highly biased in the groups benefiting. Institutional practice 
unknowingly favors some groups at the expense of others, while local institutions 
have not stepped in to fill the gap and to govern development interventions and 
resources more equitably. This has led to increased social differentiation, and loss 
of cohesion as local leaders and participating households are blamed for excluding 
others. Some government agencies are also seen to be corrupt, undermining 
policies that they themselves are supposed to enforce—and commitment by 
stakeholders at all levels to these policies. Table 4 summarizes local institutions 
seen to confer unequal benefits to local residents in Ginchi and Areka sites. Clearly, 
institutional biases—mostly unintentional—are widespread, and urgent action is 
needed to avoid the elite capture of benefits from their interventions. 14 
Table 4. Formal institutions with perceived unequal benefits to local 
residents 
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paying farmers to ferry 
planting materials and 
dig water trenches on 
their own land. 
Stakeholder workshops 
Site-level stakeholder workshops were the most instrumental for generating 
concrete strategies for addressing identified problems and will be the focus of this 15 
section. Following feedback of findings from the situation analysis findings, 
participants were asked to identify NRM issues requiring collective action in their 
respective sites. These are summarized in Table 5. Following prioritization, the 
priority two to four issues were selected for intervention and joint learning through 
action research. These are denoted by the cut-off line in each column of Table 5. 
The discussion of priorities generated so much enthusiasm that the group task to 
select the top two issues was sidelined in some sites, with participants refusing to 
eliminate some themes from intervention. This caused some sites to select three or 
four topics for intervention rather than the specified two. 
Collective action can be fostered through both negotiation support of local 
stakeholders (to reach local agreements) and by-law reforms (to enforce local 
agreements), while changes in institutional practice can be fostered through 
facilitated learning-in-practice. Participants were therefore asked to highlight 
specific types of interventions required for each of the prioritized action research 
themes, namely: (i) negotiation support; (ii) by-law reforms; and (iii) changes in 
institutional practice. Proposals made by participants, summarized in Table 6, 
formed the basis for action research interventions.  
Given the verification of problems stemming from limited stakeholder 
collaboration at the local level (horizontal stakeholder engagement) as well as from 
poorly structured linkages with external organizations (vertical stakeholder 
engagement), each of these was prioritized in action research. Table 7 summarizes 
how the case studies presented in the next section relate to these two levels of 
intervention. While a few case studies may be clearly defined around horizontal or 
vertical stakeholder engagement, a few others clearly combine both strategies in 
the identification of solutions.  16 
Table 5. NRM issues identified by stakeholders as requiring collective action in each benchmark site 
Areka Ginchi  Kabale  Kapchorwa   
1.  Spring development 
(appropriate tree 
species and spring 
maintenance) 
2.  Equitable approaches to 
technology 
dissemination 
3.  Boundary tree 
management 
4.  Collective action for the 
control of pests, 




5.  Soil conservation 
(common drainage 
ways, collective action 
for labor-intensive 
activities) 
6.  Management of 
communal grazing land 
7.  Loss of income at 
harvest (seed 
consumption, early 
harvest / sale) 
8.  Policy issues required to 
address all watershed 
themes 













3.  Niche-compatible 
agroforestry (farm 
boundaries) 
4.  Savings and credit 
associations 
5.  Controlling livestock 
movement for 
protection of outfield 
investments 
6.  Crop diversification 
7.  Equitable approaches to 
technology 
dissemination 
8.  Dung collection from 
outfields (collective 
action to regulate 
access to dung, 
alternative fuel source) 
1.  Enhanced cooperation in 
natural resource 
management among 
watershed residents  
2.  Harmonizing by-laws 
between conservation 
zones and adjacent 
areas (with and 
emphasis on free 
grazing)  
3.  Soil erosion control, 
emphasizing steep 
slopes and impacts on 
valley bottom plots  
4.  Minimizing harmful 
agroforestry practices, 
especially on land 
boundaries 
--------- 
5.  Strengthening women’s 
decision-making and 
tenure rights over land  
6.  Land boundary conflicts 
7.  Controlling bush burning 
8.  Constructing / 
maintaining water 
sources 
9.  Equitable inheritance 
practices 
 
1.  Collective action in 
enterprise development 
and making land 
investments 
2.  Co-management of 
resources of protected 
area buffer zone and 
benefits sharing 
3.  Collective action to 
mitigate conflicts in NRM 
accruing from diverse or 
unclear property 
regimes (land, tree, 
water, grazing rights) 
and sharing of benefit 
streams 
--------- 
4.  Collective action in eco-
friendly practices for 
landscape-level 
conservation 
5.  Conflicts from poor 
farming practices and 
wild fires 
6.  Collective action to 
enable investments in 
labor-demanding NRM 
activities, especially for 
sick women. 
7.  Access to information on 
technologies and 
financing  
                                                      
 
3 Broken line represents the cut-off for activities chosen for implementation (above the line). 17 
Table 6. Interventions proposed during national stakeholder meeting to enhance collective action in 
NRM  
Intervention Areka  Ginchi  Kabale  Kapchorwa 
Negotiation 
support 
1.  Negotiating access to 
technologies by groups facing 
barriers (women, poor) 
2.  Widespread mobilization for 
porcupine control with 
involvement of elders and 
mengistaw budin (governmental 
body), and research different 
“treatments” in different villages 
3.  Involve Peasant Association and 
religious leaders to facilitate 
negotiations for farm boundary 
management by gender, wealth, 
and divergent interests 
(cultivating and affected 
farmers) to identify appropriate 
niches for Eucalyptus and 
appropriate substitute species 
4.  Foster negotiations on spring 
management by gender, wealth, 
and divergent interests (land 
owners and spring users), 
involving government and 
religious leaders, to minimize 
the effect of Eucalyptus on water 
and ensure equitable 
contributions to spring 
maintenance 
5.  Negotiating soil conservation 
activities among adjacent farms 
and administrative units, 
adapting technologies to land 
size and farming system 
1.  Negotiating 
regulations on 
livestock movement 





2.  Negotiating trees 
compatible with 
springs (among 
spring owners and 
users) and farm 
boundaries (among 
farm owners and 
affected farmers) 
3.  Negotiating equitable 
contributions to 
spring maintenance 








5.  Negotiate benefits 
sharing of introduced 
technologies 



















been lacking.  








2.  Negotiate 




3.  Negotiating 




Mt. Elgon NP 
by indigenous 
people  
4.  Negotiating 
compatible 
technologies  
5.  Mobilization 











Table 7. Forms of stakeholder engagement promoted through different 
action research themes and sites  
Form of Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Case Studies 
Horizontal  1. Porcupine control in Areka, Ethiopia 
2. Enabling outfield conservation investments in the Galessa highlands 
(Ginchi site), Ethiopia 
Horizontal and vertical  1. Participatory governance of natural resources in Kabale District, Uganda  
2. Facilitation of equitable technology dissemination in Areka, Ethiopia 
Vertical  1. Facilitation of co-management of the Mt. Elgon National Park in 
Kapchorwa District, Uganda 
Lessons from implementation of prioritized actions 
While many of the interventions are at early stages of implementation, early 
successes suggest the promise of building upon negotiation support in enhancing 
collective action in natural resource management at the local level and improving 
institutional practice to enhance equitable benefits capture from development 
interventions. Results will be presented in the form of case studies by action 
research theme. The first three case studies emphasize horizontal stakeholder 
engagement processes, while the last two emphasize vertical forms of engagement 
with outside institutions. 
Case #1: Porcupine Control in Areka, Southern Ethiopia 
Background 
Crested porcupine is the most important vertebrate pest in Gununo Watershed, as 
identified by farmers during a stakeholder workshop held in Soddo in 2004. While a 
number of traditional control mechanisms were known, some were coveted by local 
experts earning a living for their specialized knowledge. Furthermore, application of 
known control methods on an individual basis was ineffective in controlling the pest, 
given that porcupines travel more than 14 km in a single night, and infestation 
rates from neighboring farms and villages were high. Collective action was 
therefore seen as essential for controlling this problem. 
Objectives of the activity included the following: 
•  To assess and determine effective traditional porcupine control methods, 
and assess their impact on crop loss to porcupine, food security, and 
livelihoods in the study area; 
•  To evaluate effective approaches to mobilize collective action for porcupine 
control; and  
•  To develop decision support tools from the challenges and lessons learnt 
for use by other research and development organizations. 
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Strategy used to foster collective action in porcupine control 
The approach used to foster collective action in porcupine control consisted of 
the following main steps: 
1.  Identify indigenous and chemical pest control methods and the landscape 
niches where each is best applied through interviews with key informants, 
and design treatments to test different control methods; 
2.  Discussion facilitated by HARC scientists on the most appropriate forms of 
collective action for coordinating the porcupine control campaign and by-
law reforms; 
3.  Stakeholder identification through consultations with randomly selected 
households; 
4.  HARC-facilitated negotiations between different interest groups to 
generate solutions acceptable to all (with an emphasis on highly affected 
farmers and farmers less affected by porcupines); 
5.  Village-level meetings facilitated by AHI-CAPRi
4 community facilitator to 
formulate by-laws on porcupine control with full participation of each 
village; 
6.  Training by expert farmers and HARC scientists on the application of 
indigenous and chemical methods of porcupine control, emphasizing 
strategies previously unknown to them (namely, the wire trap method), 
and of development unit (DU) leaders on the collection of data on 
numbers of porcupines killed/caught, methods used, and so on using 
prepared data collection forms; 
7.  Mass mobilization by community members in the application of identified 
treatments; 
8.  Data collection, monitoring, and evaluation by DU leaders and Unit 
farmers. 
Findings 
Farmers presented many traditional control methods for porcupine but prioritized 
three methods considered to be most effective: deeply dug pits at the outlet of a 
porcupine cave, circular ditches around graveyards, and a wire trap system. A 
fourth chemical treatment, Zinc Phosphide, was also used in combination with the 
first two methods as two additional treatments. Farmers modified the first method 
of deep digging to 3-4 meters’ depth to more shallow pits (1-1.5m) when done in 
combination with Zinc Phosphide (RATOL™). Methods were selected based on their 
suitability to different niches within each DU. These would be applied during the 
season when porcupines are most harmful to crops.  
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram representing a trial site and buffer zone of 
porcupine control 
The research involved collective action across all sub-PAs under each DU. 
Farmers selected DUs units of collective action because they have the ability to 
enforce local by-laws in support of collective action, and—with only 25 to 30 
households—may easily manage collective action and monitor activities during 
implementation. During the campaign, each developmental group assigned one to 
two developmental days per week assigned for collective action against porcupine 
control alone in the watershed. It was further decided that the PA Magistrate Court 
and local leaders will follow up in by-laws enforcement during the collective action 
period.  
Social negotiations were then supported among farmers whose crops are 
frequently affected and the least affected households, as well as with farmers 
participating and not participating in the Safety Net Program.
5 By-laws were then 
                                                      
 
5 The Safety Net Program is a government program designed to help low income farmers by 
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the government. However, negotiations led to the joint conclusion that porcupines are a problem for 

















formulated through full participation of farmers and distributed to all PA and sub-PA 
leaders.  
Once control methods, administrative units, and by-laws for operationalize 
collective action were established, and the relevant individuals trained on control 
methods and data collection procedures, the campaign was launched. Farmers 
passed on foot and vehicles with mega-phones and local music were used to 
publicize the campaign across all DUs, villages and PAs. Following the campaign, 
records were taken by DU leaders on the number of porcupines caught or killed by 
different farmers, villages, niches, and control methods. 
Final numbers indicated that 984 porcupine were killed or caught through 
collective action in the watershed in a single growing season. Among Gununo 
watershed, Offa village ranked first in the control of porcupine. This may be 
attributed to the high levels of collective action sustained by all households. This 
high level of collective action was in turn due to higher levels of porcupine 
infestation in this village relative to other villages in watershed, as evidence by the 
high number of porcupine niches known in the village (more than 100). The use of 
rodenticide in combination with the modified deep digging (1.5m depth) at the 
outlet of the porcupine hole proved to be the most effective control methods 
compared to other methods.  
A number of important outcomes and impacts were observed from the 
collective approach to porcupine control, namely: 
•  Increased motivation for working together toward common problems 
among watershed farmers; 
•  Decreased time and energy spent keeping watch of crops at night, leading 
to substantial improvements in quality of life; 
•  Decrease human disease resulting from staying outside all night long, and 
decreased frequency of visiting health centers, clinics, and hospitals; and 
•  Household incomes and food security increased from reduced crop losses 
by porcupine. 
Lessons 
The following lessons can be distilled from this case study: 
•  Efforts spent in pest control will be disproportionate to the rewards; 
collective approaches can substantially increase returns from investments 
of individual farmers. 
•  Combining local knowledge, introduced technologies, and collective action 
into a single strategy can produce synergies otherwise unattainable by 
individual strategies in isolation. 
•  By-laws can help to substantially advance collective action by minimizing 
free riders who can easily undermine collective action initiatives. 22 
Case #2: Participatory Governance of Natural Resources in Kabale District, Uganda  
Background 
In Rubaya sub-county, like in many other areas in the Kigezi highlands of 
southwestern Uganda, land management has taken on huge dimensions as one of 
the leading human and environmental challenges. Natural resource management 
has mainly taken the form of scattered individual farmers each independently 
carrying out land conservation measures on their small land plots. Most NGOs 
working in NRM in the region tend to emphasize technological dimensions of NRM, 
often neglecting community perceptions and interests, and the social and 
psychological dynamics underlying human behavior. Government organizations 
such as the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) had, for 
example, paid community members to implement land management technologies, 
such as digging water trenches on their own land. Because development agencies 
supporting NRM work with farmer groups initially often end up supporting few 
households and supporting individualized decisions on land management, many 
problems that are collective in nature remain unaddressed. Examples include land 
conflicts, incompatible trees on farm boundaries, destruction of crops from free 
grazing and bush burning, and acute land degradation (such as gulleys or 
landslides) requiring collective solutions. Finally, poor leadership and non-
enforcement of NRM by-laws has led to a situation where rules, where present, are 
left un-enforced. Local Environmental Committees (LECs) were established by local 
government to coordinate and oversee environmental concerns at Parish and Sub-
County level. These Committees are perceived by farmers as dysfunctional due to 
financial and capacity constraints and lack of downward accountability. Other local 
institutional structures for NRM have also been established through research and 
development interventions. In Rubaya Sub-County, the location of this study, 
AHI/CIAT
6 has established Policy Task Forces (PTFs) in 4 pilot villages to address 
NRM conflicts. While collective action in NRM is much stronger in these villages as a 
result, the effectiveness of by-laws under their jurisdiction is still undermined by 
inadequate enforcement, lack of political will, and inadequate support to 
technological options meant to operationalize the by-laws.  
Strategy for enhancing multi-stakeholder efforts in NRM 
AHI-CAPRi facilitated multi-stakeholder efforts for improved NRM in three sub-
counties of Kabale District. From the outset, AHI-CAPRi set out to build on existing 
institutional foundations—namely, LECs and PTFs. The foundations set by earlier 
work on by-laws provided a strong foundation for early successes in Rubaya Sub-
County. Results are therefore presented for Rubaya, including both the initial 4 pilot 
villages located in three parishes as well as two additional villages located in two 
additional parishes. These additional villages were included to cover areas worst 
affected by land degradation, and to scale up interventions from original pilot 
villages. 
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AHI-CAPRi followed a series of eight steps to engage stakeholders to develop 
collective solutions to shared NRM problems. These steps included: 
1.  Community fora were called by sub-county and village leadership 
representatives and identified volunteer community-based NRM 
facilitators, and communities were sensitized by leading them through a 
self-analysis of the role of collective action in NRM and livelihoods; 
2.  Meetings facilitated by the AHI-CAPRi community facilitator (CF) at sub-
county level with representatives from pilot villages and local leaders 
(elected officials and opinion leaders) to identify or develop organizational 
structures for spearheading NRM at sub-county and village levels; 
3.  Capacity building of existing or new structures by CF and local 
government on their roles and responsibilities in NRM;  
4.  Support to NRM structures to lead a participatory review of existing by-
laws in the four villages with longstanding involvement in AHI and 
formulation of new by-laws in the two new villages to strengthen natural 
resource governance;  
5.  Cross-site visits organized by the CF to bring members of villages new to 
participatory by-law reforms and sub-county leadership to communities 
that had successfully implemented model NRM by-laws and technologies 
for experiential sharing; 
6.  Multi-stakeholder workshop to harmonize by-laws emanating from the 6 
villages at sub-county level with representatives of sub-county and village 
NRM structures, each village (LC1s, male and female farmer 
representatives), local government (sub-county chief, LC3 chairperson 
and secretary for Production) and the NAADS Coordinator; 
7.  Technical support provided by CF to sub-county NRM structures to plan 
and facilitate parish and village meetings for the purpose of sensitizing 
community members and eliciting their feedback on newly revised or 
formulated by-laws at sub-county, parish and village levels; 
8.  Lobby leadership to endorse by-laws which will apply uniformly at sub-
county level. 
Findings 
The sub-county leadership and community representatives resolved that new 
organizational structures be established to supersede both PTFs and LECs but 
incorporate their functions. Reasons mentioned by farmers and other stakeholders 
included the fact that some PTFs were not fully functional, and new pilot 
communities lacked these structures. LECs, on the other hand, were said to exist 
only in name. They were constituted via appointments by the sub-county leadership 
and of limited effectiveness due to inadequate financial resources and ambiguity in 
their roles and responsibilities. Thus, NRMPCs were constituted at sub-county and 
village levels to spearhead NRM initiatives, comprised of sub-county and village 
leadership (ex-officio members) and elected committee members. NRMPCs differed 
were seen as more representative than prior structures, extending to village level 
through involvement LC1 leaders, farmer representatives, and community-based 24 
NRM facilitators. Furthermore, at sub-county level, they were composed of all 
representatives of LCs from pilot villages, village NRMPCs, community-based 
facilitators, and ex-officio members at the sub-county level. PTFs included only two 
members at Parish level drawn from the pilot villages. 
In villages where by-law reforms were ongoing under AHI, participatory 
review of by-laws was carried out to address deficiencies of existing by-laws. Some 
of the existing by-laws lacked punitive measures, such as fines. Other by-laws were 
too general in nature, failing to specify how they would be operationalized. In 
villages new to participatory governance, new by-laws were established. Most of 
these were derived from experiences from other communities with experience in 
participatory by-law reforms, taking into account the unique circumstances and 
land management challenges in a particular community or landscape or felt NRM 
needs. Following the formulation of by-laws on free grazing and soil and water 
conservation, technologies were seen as necessary for by-law implementation. For 
example, prohibitions on free grazing require alternative sources of fodder and soil, 
and water conservation would require planting of trees and grasses to stabilize 
conservation structures. Collective action emerged around communal tree nurseries 
for this purpose.  
Cross-site visits proved instrumental in motivating additional interest in 
improved natural resource governance in villages new to the approach due to 
concrete benefits observed. Community members were motivated by both the 
social cohesiveness for collective action, effectiveness of technologies (check dams, 
water trenches), by-laws, and the outcomes of these innovations when applied 
collectively. Cross-site visits catalyzed farmer interest to immediately return to their 
villages and implement observed methods of controlling soil erosion. Pick-axes, 
spades, and forked hoes were provided as an incentive to farmers. By-laws helped 
to mobilize collective action in constructing check dams across upper slopes to 
reduce run-off to farms below, while individually dug water trenches were used to 
capture excess water. Following construction of soil erosion control structures, 
seedlings from previously established nurseries were ready to be transplanted to 
protect the conservation structures. 
The meeting at sub-county level to harmonize by-laws led to the 
development of one final set of by-laws for adoption at the wider sub-county level 
(see Box 1). Several different types of criteria were used in this harmonization 
process. The sub-county chief assumed veto power to ensure that locally 
formulated by-laws adhere to national laws on maximum fines
7 and their feasibility 
under existing financial and land use scenarios. Where fines were conflicting but not 
considered too high by the Chief, participants selected a single figure through 
consensus. Levels of fines selected by participants depended on their determination 
of the balance between feasibility and fairness—not too harsh to be unfair, but at 
the same time high enough to ensure that by-laws are followed. Farmers also 
strongly felt that local leaders should be exemplary in NRM. If they do not follow 
the by-laws, then everyone else feels they also have no reason to respect the law. 
Elected leaders were often reluctant to support enforcement of NRM by-laws for 
                                                      
 
7 Local Government Act of Uganda forbids by-laws established at sub-county level to fine in excess 
of two currency units (40,000 Ugandan shillings, or approximately US$25).  25 
fear of alienating the electorate, in effect jeopardizing their source of votes. 
Accordingly, one of the key roles promoted by NRMPCs was to lobby the leadership 
structures to buy into the concept of supporting the establishment and enforcement 
of NRM by-laws.  
Following this harmonization process, the NRMPC assumed responsibility for 
calling the “NRM By-law Sensitization / Stakeholder Meetings” at parish and village 
level to raise awareness on the harmonized by-laws and elicit feedback from 
farmers. Each by-law was discussed one by one in plenary, giving the participants 
the opportunity to critique the by-laws. After finishing this process, amendments 
were made to the harmonized by-laws. The by-law on bush burning, for example, 
was amended to include damage to property caused by wildfires over and above 
the fine of 10,000 shillings for those starting the fire. Farmers similarly requested 
an additional by-law amendment on free grazing, requiring the culprits to 
compensate households for the value of crops lost, soil conservation structures 
damaged, and other damages incurred.  
Lobbying to sub-county leadership for by-law endorsement was done by the 
NRMPCs from village and sub-county levels from September, 2006, following the 
harmonization of by-laws at sub-county level. As a result of persistent lobbying, by-
laws were finally endorsed by the Rubaya sub-county Local Council on January 17, 
2007. Copies of endorsed by-laws were distributed to local leaders in each village 
and to Village Information Centers. To bolster political support to by-law 
enforcement, a publicity campaign at village, parish, and sub-county levels, and 
district endorsement of by-laws were scheduled. 
Table 9 summarizes local evaluations of the project through the identification 
of local indicators and assessment of their performance. It also led to collective 
investments in over 2.5 km of check dams on upper slopes and individual 
investments in approximately 6.4 km of water trenches on private property. 26 
Box 1. Reformulated and harmonized by-laws in Rubaya sub-county
* 
 
Soil and Water Conservation: 
  Everyone shall dig water trenches (soil erosion structures), especially on hillsides in their own 
land prior to any cultivation. Anyone who violates the above by-law will be liable to a fine, 
which will be decided by the sub-county (LC3) council, in collaboration with representatives 
of Policy Task Forces (PTFs). 
  Napier/Elephant grass and other grasses (and/or trees) shall be planted in landscapes where 
water trenches are not feasible, such as in very rocky or rugged terrain. 
  Every farmer should consult neighboring land owners prior to breaking down the terrace or 
contour bund along the common land demarcations or borders. 
  No one shall cultivate their land without digging water trenches, planting trees and grasses, 
to conserve soil and water in their own land. 
  Prior to cultivating, everyone should excavate trenches, steps, and A frames. 
 
Those who violate these by-laws shall be fined 5,000 Uganda Shillings (UGX) and do the needful; 
or else they will be forwarded to the LC 3 council authorities for punishment.  
 
Grazing: 
  No one shall graze in the valley whether or not the land in the valley is one’s own. 
  Everyone shall graze in their own land; and if not, seek permission to graze in others’ land. 
Any abandoned land—including hill top land—should be utilized for growing agro-forestry 
species. 
  No one is allowed to come from another country and graze in Uganda. [Ref: Rwanda]. 
 
Those who violate these by-laws will be fined UGX 10,000. 
 
Water: 
  Everyone who draws water from a communal water source or well shall cooperate with 
others in its cleaning or maintenance.  
  Anyone utilizing land near a communal well, road, foot path, or water trench should reserve 
a stretch of 1-2 meters of uncultivated land between their land and the said communal 
structures. 
  No one is allowed to graze, cultivate, and wash clothes from the well.  
 
Those who violate this by-law will be fined UGX 5,000. 
 
Other: 
  Burning of grasses, hillsides, weeds and trees is strictly prohibited (Those who violate this 
by-law will be fined Sh. 10,000). 
  When cultivating, leave some reserve narrow strips of land along boundaries, the road side, 
livestock tracks, etc. (Those who violate this by-law will be fined Sh. 5,000). 
  Whoever cuts down trees should plant more (Those who violate this by-law will be fined Sh. 
5,000). 
  Every household should cultivate fruits, such as Avocados (Those who violate this by-law will 
be fined Sh. 5,000). 
  Anyone who owns or rents land in another village should abide by the NRM by-laws obtaining 
in that village.  
 
Note: Village Policy Task Forces (PTF) should have representatives at LC 3 (sub-county) level.  
* By-laws in italicized font are those which are newly proposed by communities. 27 
Table 9. Observed changes in local indicators for participatory by-law 
reforms 
Observed Change  Indicators 
More harmony cultivated 
between crop farmers and 
livestock owners 
  Fewer NRM conflicts (cases) registered in LC courts. 
  More compliance to by-laws on grazing, e.g. irresponsible free 
range grazing progressively diminishing as more farmers are 
adopting zero grazing and planting of fodder crops. 
More people changing their 
attitudes to embrace NRM 
  More people voluntarily attending NRM meetings and practicing 
improved soil erosion control technologies, such as digging 
check dams and planting trees and grasses. 
  More neighboring farmers working both individually and 
collectively on digging erosion control check dams and 
trenches. 
   The wealthy community members beginning to work with the 
poor members on collective NRM. 
Improved awareness that 
check dams and water trenches 
are effective means of 
controlling soil erosion in hilly 
terrain. 
  More people increasingly adopting digging check dams and 
water trenches to counter soil erosion. 
  Those who dug check dams have testified that this dramatically 
checked soil erosion, for example, in Mushenyi village. 
  Better methods of digging erosion control structures. 
Lessons 
This case study illustrates the following principles for collective action in NRM: 
•  In initial stages of intervention, there is strong need to take time to 
sensitize and train local resource users on the benefits of improved NRM 
and natural resource governance; 
•  Political commitment plays vital role in NRM, especially in mobilization, 
sensitization, policy formulation, and by-law enforcement. 
•  Changing peoples’ attitudes to embrace land management/NRM practices 
is a long-term process, as illustrated by the greater responsiveness of 
farmers in the sub-county where by-law reforms had a longer history. 
•  Sustainable land management, often treated as the responsibility of 
individual households by farmers and development agencies alike, 
requires collective effort in the form of collective rules and regulations and 
implementation of agreements. 
•  Promoting by-law implementation without putting in place the requisite 
technological options to facilitate their implementation is futile, as farmers 
will have no choice but to ignore by-laws if no livelihood alternatives exist 
to meet their basic needs. 
Case #3: Equitable Technology Dissemination in Areka 
Gununo Watershed is located in the high lands of southern Ethiopia where land is 
scarce due to intense population pressure. Productivity of crops is very low due to 
several factors of which poor genetic potential is one. Thus, food shortage is 
common for at least three months, even in years of good rainfall. The government 
has tried to disseminate improved seeds to farmers through credit. However, 
repayment rates were very low, and the government is currently disseminating 
improved seeds to farmers for cash payment. As most farmers in the watershed are 28 
resource poor, especially women, it has become difficult for them to access 
improved seeds through this system. During preliminary focus group discussions, 
women complained of an extreme gender bias in agricultural extension. Hence, a 
participatory action research was conducted on how to enhance improved seed 
access in the watershed since 2005 through the support of AHI.  
Intervention Strategy 
Following identification of gender inequities in agricultural extension during gender-
disaggregated focus group discussions (situation analysis) (see Figure 3), 
community meetings were called by AARC (Adet Agricultural Research Centre) 
scientists and CAPRi community facilitators to discuss the way forward. The 
meetings were held at village level (five villages of Gununo Watershed) to identify 
and prioritize local problems and possible solutions. These decisions, involving by-
law formulation and technology multiplication following the specifications laid out in 
by-laws, were then reviewed and approved in a watershed-wide forum again 
facilitated by AHI site teams. Innovative farmers were selected by the watershed 
community and five farmer research groups (FRGs) were formed (one per village) 
in two PAs to evaluate crop varieties and identify those with high levels of 
acceptance by farmers. As varieties were being evaluated, draft by-laws specifying 
rules and procedures for equitable technology multiplication and dissemination were 
developed at village level through focused discussion with farmer representatives 
chosen by wealth status and gender. These draft by-laws were then authenticated 
by local PA leaders for subsequent enforcement. Seeds of tested crop varieties 
(Boloso-I for taro, Simba for wheat) were given to farmers according to rules 
established in the by-laws, through a system of in-kind credit and following 
trainings on management practices. These farmers agreed in turn to multiply and 
transfer the same amount of seed they were given to other selected farmers 
according to agreed by-laws. Follow-up monitoring to ensure compliance with 
agreed by-laws was done by FRG leaders, FRG members and other male and female 
watershed residents at various stages of the process. FRG leaders were charged 
with the responsibility of reporting offenders to the local administration, who would 
in turn take action through the local PA courts. Data were collected on the 
repayment process and farmers’ perceptions about the effectiveness of the 
approach.  29 
Figure 3. Steps in the approach to equitable technology dissemination 
Findings 
FRGs established. To implement the proposed community plan of participatory seed 
technology evaluation, multiplication, and dissemination, FRGs were established to 
enable a greater number of farmers to participate in research and extension 
activities in the watershed. FRG members were selected by the community and 
included farmers from different social categories (women, poor, poorer, and 
wealthier farmers). A total of five FRGs were established in the five zones of the 
watershed. Each was established in an area (village) rather than around a particular 
crop. This was done to reduce the difficulty in management and facilitation of 
greater numbers of FRGs than if they were crop-based.  
By-law formulated. To enhance crop production and address challenges of 
technology access, farmers felt it necessary to identify local seed multiplication and 
dissemination channels that would give equal consideration to different categories 
of farmers, independent of gender or wealth. Thus, the local by-law was established 
to establish equitable and sustainable technology multiplication and dissemination. 
A number of meetings were held with key informants and with the community to 
develop the draft by-law. Finally, agreement was reached to have one by-law which 
was believed to benefit all social categories equally throughout the watershed. The 
by-law was authorized by two PA leaders and social court judges.  
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According to the by-law, one third of the beneficiaries must be women while 
selecting beneficiary farmers. A farmer has to manage the new starter seed 
given to him/her better than or equivalent to his/her own private seed. 
He/she has to transfer equal amounts of improved seed he/she was given 
initially to another farmer selected by FRG leaders immediately after 
harvest. If he/she needs to sale the surplus product, he/she has to sell it to 
farmers within the watershed at a free market price until all the watershed 
community gets access to the improved seed. If there is not anyone who 
wants to buy the seed within the watershed, the seed owner can sell his/her 
product out of the watershed after informing the situation to FRG leaders. If 
a farmer disobeys the by-law, he/she will be accused by FRG leaders to the 
PA court. The PA court will make the judgment and the PA leaders take 
action based on the results of the judge. If a farmer partially loses his/her 
seed through natural disaster, he/she will transfer less amount based on the 
FRG leaders’ judgment.  
Box 1. Articles in the by-law 
Seed multiplication and dissemination. Selected varieties of seed from taro and 
wheat and taro corms were distributed to farmers as starter seed through FRG 
leaders. These crop varieties were evaluated by farmers before wider 
dissemination. Farmers were given starter seeds in credit (credit in kind without 
interest) so that they would pay back equal amount of seed to be transferred to 
other selected farmers until the entire watershed community gains access. One 
hundred sixty farmers from five villages were each given five kilograms of improved 
wheat seed (varieties Wabe and Abola). This amount of starter seed was assumed 
to cover an area of 400m
2 land. Similarly, corms of an improved taro variety called 
Boloso-I was distributed as planting material to over 120 farmers. The FRG leaders 
monitored seed multiplication and dissemination from sowing to harvest. The yield 
of the new variety of taro was by far higher than the local cultivars and was 
preferred by all farmers also for its other characteristics. The high yield was 
attributed to the high number of tillers (up to 40) and corms per hill, coupled with 
relative tolerance to low moisture stress. Currently, the new taro variety is 
disseminating very fast, primarily through purchase, and farmers said “thanks to 
the new taro variety we do not need food aid from the government hereafter”. 
Performance of new wheat varieties was similar to the local variety and variable 
from one farm and village to another due to differences in fertilizer application and 
weeding.  
Credit repayment and by-law implementation. Based on the by-law, all farmers 
successfully repaid taro, while rates of repayment of wheat seed varied by village, 
with about 25 percent of farmers in Gegecho and Ofa repaying only after follow-up 
negotiations and farmers in the remaining villages paying voluntarily. Despite the 
lower rates of repayment of wheat, repayment nevertheless improved over the 
formal extension system by 24 to 277 percent among different watershed villages.  
Those farmers who did not repay their credit were accused at local courts 
through FRG leaders of their respective villages. Most of them expected exemption 
from repayment, as previously experienced, but acknowledged their responsibility. 31 
A few said that their wheat yield was poor, and because of that they were unable to 
repay.  
Outcomes 
Some of the benefits of the approach may be attributed to the technologies 
disseminated. In a participatory monitoring and evaluation exercise, all of the 
interviewed farmers said that the new taro variety had greatly contributed to 
increasing food security in the watershed due to its high productivity, early harvest, 
and resistance to decay when stored in the field for long periods. This has extended 
the season in which food is readily available in farmers’ fields from 4/5 months to 
7/8 months a year. The high productivity of the new taro variety also plays a vital 
role in alleviating the problem of land scarcity in the watershed. The variety is also 
becoming a cash crop. Some farmers said that they had never received such 
income from any other crop—even from coffee, Ethiopia’s primary cash crop. Some 
farmers declared a 225 percent increase in income relative to the local variety in 
the same area of land. One farmer received more than 2000 Birr (US$230) from 
taro in 2006, and several households are expanding the area under taro cultivation. 
The variety also saves on fuel wood, from three bundles of fuel wood to one to cook 
a pot of taro. The Ministry of Agriculture at the district level is now trying to put this 
variety in its regular food security program after visiting Gununo watershed.  
Yet the benefits go beyond the technologies to the approach used, bringing 
more equitable benefits to women and poor farmers relative to the formal extension 
service. Farmers in some villages stated that no female-headed households in their 
villages had ever accessed improved seed through the formal extension system. At 
the end of the season, farmers claimed more than a five-fold improvement in 
technology access by women and an almost three-fold improvement in access by 
poorer households. In-kind credit was also seen as more favourable to farmers than 
financial loans, as was the ability of farmers to learn about new technologies prior 
to adoption through prior testing of technologies within FRGs. Unlike the previous 
credit system in which farmers consume or sell all of their produce to escape 
repayment, most farmers were able to maintain improved seed for the next 
planting season. Surprisingly, farmers claimed to prefer the approach over the 
current Safety Net Program, which gives seed to resource poor farmers at no cost. 
While partially attributable to the variety used, the approach to on-farm screening 
was also instrumental in improving varietal performance.  
Given their previous experience, farmers were reluctant to work with 
researchers in the beginning, assuming nothing new would come to them. The 
relationship between researchers and farmers has improved due to the active 
participation of farmers and greater consideration of their interests by researchers. 
Farmers outside of the research area liked the current study and started requesting 
their administrators to have credit be repaid by seed rather than cash. 
In addition to these initial successes, several challenges were noted that 
hindered the effectiveness of the approach:  
•  A few FRG leaders were unable to carry out agreed roles and 
responsibilities effectively. This had negative implication on the by-law 
implementation process, as reflected in incorrect selection (bias) of 
farmers and limited follow-up to crop management. 32 
•  It was uncommon to accuse relatives or neighbors who failed to repay 
credit.  
•  The by-law lacked an article to hold FRG and local administrative leaders 
accountable to agreements, undermining repayment rates.  
•  Although one third of the beneficiary farmers had to be women, it was 
challenging to maintain this proportion for each technology due to 
inadequate land tenure and use rights.  
•  Farmers following poor cultural practices (weeding, fertilization) caused 
crop yield to be reduced, with negative implications for repayment. 
•  Some farmers were reluctant to repay, giving different reasons such as 
crop damage and seed impurity. A few farmers also took seeds while they 
did not have enough land left to plant/sow. Favoring newly introduced 
varieties, others tried to return non-true seed purchased from market 
rather than the new varieties. 
•  While access to seed among different social categories improved within the 
watershed, the approach did not adequately address seed demand from 
farmers residing outside of the watershed in the same administrative 
zones. 
These challenges nevertheless provide lessons on how to improve upon the 
approach in the future. 
Lessons 
The following lessons may be distilled from this case study: 
•  Farmers tend to respect their social by-laws more than government rules 
in credit repayment for improved seed, suggesting that locally negotiated 
by-laws have great promise in strengthening equitable development 
processes. 
•  Negotiating repayment is more effective than formal law enforcement. 
More farmers who did not pay their credit in time repaid following 
informal negotiation than formal accusation.  
•  The behaviour of individual FRG leaders played a big role in repayment of 
in-kind loans, suggesting that FRG leadership selection process needs to 
be researched in greater detail.  
•  Credit repayment rates improve when high yielding and preferred crop 
varieties are provided. On the other hand, deficiencies of the technologies 
may cause erroneous assumptions about the effectiveness of by laws. 
•  The varieties under dissemination have become familiar within a short 
period, and the dissemination process hastened beyond expectation. This 
was particularly true for taro, which was introduced targeting increased 
food availability, but has also become a cash crop.  
•  Most farmers who failed to repay in-kind loans were prohibited to take new 
seeds. While this is harsh punishment for the offenders, it will strengthen 
technology access in the future by improving rates of repayment and 
farmer-to-farmer spread of technologies. 33 
Case #4: Co-Management of Mount Elgon National Park 
Conservation Policy in Uganda 
In the 1930s, the British colonial government declared the Mount Elgon area a 
Crown forest and gazetted it as a forest reserve, officially excluding people from the 
area. The native Benet (Ndorobo), however, continued to occupy the area until 
1983, when the Government of Uganda changed the official designation to Mt. 
Elgon Forest Park, forcing all people still residing within the Park boundaries to 
leave the protected area. A portion of the area was de-gazetted to resettle the 
Benets. In 1993, the Government of Uganda again changed the designation of the 
protected area to Mt. Elgon National Park, shifting management from the Forest 
Department to the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). This led to tighter restrictions 
on protected area access by local people, further souring relations between 
communities and Park staff, and leading to illegal harvesting of park resources by 
local residents—a practice tacitly accepted by corrupt park rangers. From 1995 a 
new co-management policy was implemented for all protected areas in Uganda. 
This policy was designed to improve relations with local people through a move 
toward shared responsibility for park management and conservation as well as 
shared benefits. 
Consequences for livelihoods, conservation, and people-park relations 
Up until the 1970s, there was no legal permission to cultivate in the forest, and the 
forest was left intact. However, the indigenous Sabiny or Benet were given special 
consideration outside the law (through an informal understanding), as their land 
use practices posed no threat to the health of the forest reserve. Cultivation was 
only practiced in the Moorlands, and forest use was limited to hunting and 
gathering. The status of the forest during this period was overseen jointly by Forest 
Department and community leaders.  
In the 1980s, resettlement of the communities outside the park marginalized 
the Benet from their traditional resource base and livelihood system. After 
prolonged pressure from the Benet community (a group of elders) and District 
leaders, an area of the Forest Reserve was de-gazetted for use by the Benet. In the 
process of resettlement, not all the Benets were resettled, and some remain 
landless to date, illegally settled inside the National Park. Following this period, the 
Benet community no longer had legal rights to own and utilize the land they had 
inhabited for the previous 200 years. There was no effective consultation process 
for the future use of the protected area or discussions of what alternatives the 
community had to sustain their livelihood. The livelihood changes induced by 
resettlement and growth in human and livestock population only increased pressure 
on park resources, compromising both livelihood and conservation objectives.  
 When management of the Forest Reserve shifted to UWA in 1993, the 
relations between the Benet and the government deteriorated quickly as a result of 
harsh enforcement of exclusionary policies. Livestock grazing and cultivation of 
Irish potatoes in the Moorlands was prohibited, and any remaining Benet homes 
inside the protected area were burned. The informal community of elders, with the 
support of Action Aid and Land Alliance, formed a legal entity called the Benet 34 
Lobby Group. The Benet Lobby Group and Benet Settlers Association (BESA) 
worked at local and national levels to raise awareness of immediate risks to their 
livelihoods, and sustained a court case against the Government of Uganda until its 
resolution in favour of the Benet in 2005. Exclusionary policies had a number of 
other negative spin-offs, including increased corruption by protected area officials 
as they encouraged bribes from local elites (mostly non-Benet) for access to forest 
resources. The pressure was borne largely by women and children, who were 
physically abused. More recent co-management policies have brought no benefits to 
the Benet due to government favouritism toward other ethnic groups with whom 
they have no history of conflict, but who have limited to no customary rights to 
these resources.  
Empowering the Benet to benefit from co-management policies 
The Kapchorwa District Landcare Chapter (KADLACC), with the technical and 
financial support from AHI-CAPRi, is working to bring an intervention that will end 
this impasse between the Benet and UWA. The intervention strategy included the 
following steps: 
1.  Participatory mapping with district stakeholders by KADLACC to identify 
interest groups to be involved in co-management and equitable benefits 
sharing in the protected area. 
2.  Focus group discussions, facilitated by KADLACC, with each of the 
identified stakeholder groups: four Benet villages located in the de-
gazetted zone, UWA (Community Rangers with their Sector Head), and 
the Benet living outside the resettlement zone. 
3.  Stakeholder meeting facilitated by district champions to initiate dialogue 
on co-management among various government departments (Agriculture, 
Environment, Forest), community-based organizations (CBOs), farmer 
groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A consensus was 
reached on key issues from the community’s point of view, and 
community members presented requests for technologies that could 
address their livelihood and conservation needs. 
4.  Visit by KADLACC to the UWA Sector Warden’s office to communicate the 
Benet’s interest in acquiring technologies found in the UWA field office. 
UWA obliged by providing tree and fodder planting materials. 
5.  A District level meeting, facilitated by KADLACC, was held involving 
community representatives, sub-county council members, the UWA Sector 
Head, district leaders, and local government departments. The discussion 
entailed the following: 
−  Exploration of livelihood and conservation issues surrounding the Park 
and areas of mutual interest among the various stakeholders; 
−  Exploration of possibilities for co-management, given the highly 
polarized views from the different parties and the ongoing court case 
between the Benet and UWA, in which it was agreed that this would 
not deter an informal consensus-building process; and 35 
−  Development of an action plan around agreements reached, including 
specified days when the Benet can collect honey and bamboo shoots in 
exchange for community contributions to controlling illegal activities 
within Park boundaries.  
6.  Informal discussions among community members and KADLACC on the 
types of activities that could be negotiated to further build the relationship 
with UWA while posing no significant threat to conservation objectives of 
the protected area.  
7.  Multi-stakeholder meetings facilitated by KADLACC at Parish level with 
community representatives, an UWA official, and representatives of sub-
county government to elicit community views on protected area 
management and negotiate rights and responsibilities in co-management.  
Outcomes 
The reconciliation process was jump-started through UWA efforts to share 
technologies with the Benet and by initiating collaboration around issues mutually 
agreed upon. From within each stakeholder group, allies closer to reconciliation 
were identified, and a trust-building process was initiated at different levels of 
governance. Through informal lobbying, the parties were enabled to understand 
each other’s points of view, facilitating agreements to be reached on the process to 
be used in developing understanding among the stakeholders. At a later stage in 
the negotiation process, UWA representatives and the Benet were both encouraged 
to focus on the interests of the other party, with the conservation of biodiversity 
forming an agreed ‘bottom line’ objective. This enabled them to move beyond the 
former positioning around particular outcomes (such as total exclusion vs. 
restoration of historical tenure and use rights) to dialogue around resource use 
options that would not compromise the bottom line. This led to the Benet to expand 
their expectations beyond land rights to include access to resources within Park 
boundaries. The two parties were then able to reach a mutual agreement on shared 
custodianship of the Park, working collaboratively toward environmental objectives 
and creating optimism for a lasting solution. 
According to the Benet, a number of compromises were reached. In 
exchange for certain rights to park resources, the Benet must play a formal role in 
policing park entry by others. Early indicators suggest that this had increased the 
number of Benet households entering the park as well as the amount of bamboo 
being harvested from the park, but dramatically decreased the number of livestock 
grazing inside park boundaries. The number of arrests was also reported to 
decrease. These indicators—in addition to environmental condition within the park—
must be closely monitored into the future to ensure the early success in conflict 
management can be sustained. 
Lessons and insights 
Though still in its early stages, a number of lessons have emerged that will help to 
shape further interventions and which may be of use to other co-management 
processes within and outside of Uganda. These include the following: 36 
•  KADLACC provided a forum for both parties to engage positively despite 
the history of conflict and an ongoing court case. Identification of and 
support to local champions to facilitate multi-stakeholder natural resource 
management processes (in this case, co-management of the Mount Elgon 
National Park) has proven instrumental in managing conflict.  
•  Despite warnings that dialogue could not be advanced during the situation 
of intensified conflict represented by the ongoing court case, the re-
opening of dialogue on protected area co-management has created 
opportunities for rapprochement and greater mutual understanding 
despite the situation of tense conflict.  
•  Collective action among diverse stakeholders to address NRM issues within 
and outside protected areas promotes dialogue and is likely to foster 
greater access by communities to the natural resources in contention.  
•  Parallel multi-stakeholder processes at diverse levels help to bridge the 
gap between policy intent (for example, collaborative management of 
protected area resources between government and communities) and 
realities on the ground by creating dialogue among diverse interest 
groups at each level.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Local communities were found to have a rich array of collective action institutions, 
which in turn provide a variety of economic and social support functions. While 
some of these were seen to support some groups more than others, most forms of 
collective action were found to have largely positive roles to play in livelihoods. 
However, practices of formal support agencies were found to be biased by wealth, 
gender, levels of political influence, and other factors, exacerbating inequities over 
time. Action research on methodological innovations to overcome these biases and 
to build upon the strengths of local institutions is sorely needed.  
Another important finding was that local forms of collective action seldom 
emphasize common solutions to felt NRM problems other than provision of inputs 
(land, labor, capital). Efforts are sorely needed to strengthen the institutional 
foundations for community-based natural resource management. Action research 
findings have illustrated the potential for improving livelihoods and fostering more 
sustainable use of natural resources by catalyzing collective action on NRM where it 
is absent. Effective collective action seems to require use of both informal 
negotiation support processes and formal by-law reforms and enforcement. 
Participatory by-law reforms create stakeholder buy-in, which reduces ambiguity 
and makes people feel more accountable to other parties when brought to account 
for their actions. The combination of formal and informal mechanisms seem to be 
needed to revitalize natural resource governance and related livelihood and 
environmental service outcomes. External agents, whether NGOs, community-
based organizations, or local government, also have an instrumental role in bearing 
the transaction costs of organizing collective action. These roles include information 
provision, community mobilization, facilitation, advocacy, monitoring, and 
negotiation support.  37 
Overall, the findings support the two research hypotheses. Strategies to 
improve NRM at farm and landscape levels did prove to be more effective when 
more equitable decision-making processes were used to explicitly acknowledge 
diverse stakes. However, given the diversity of these stakes, by-laws also played a 
fundamental role in holding each party accountable to resolutions reached through 
negotiations. Adapting by-laws to local conditions and stakeholder priorities also 
induced marked livelihood improvements by enabling collective action and 
technology adoption. However, participatory by-law negotiations did not reduce the 
need for by-law enforcement. Rather, participation made offenders feel more 
responsible to agreements once accused, increasing the effectiveness of informal 
efforts to increase compliance. Improved governance of natural resources is, 
therefore, a process that involves overcoming past expectations and behaviours, 
and gradually learning the value of trust.  
Implications for practitioners 
•  Collective action serves critical development and social support functions 
in local communities. External institutions should seek ways to build upon 
local institutions that are highly valued or contribute most to livelihood 
goals, in particular for women and poorer households. Part of this effort 
should be oriented toward finding ways to minimize the effect of wealth 
on the potential for wealth accumulation by linking technology 
dissemination with low-risk forms of credit and diversification of assets of 
the poor.  
•  External development institutions often unintentionally increase existing 
inequities (based on gender, wealth, age, or ethnicity) by working only 
with active community members and failing to establish mechanisms for 
equitable access to project benefits. Methodological innovations to 
overcome these biases and socially-disaggregated monitoring of 
interventions (by gender and stake, and including non-participants of any 
activity) are sorely needed to capture such biases early on and identify 
ways in which they can be overcome. This is particularly true for 
agricultural research and extension and law enforcement. 
•  Local forms of collective action emphasize enhancing buying power and 
safety net functions, leaving many common natural resource management 
problems unaddressed. External support for horizontal negotiations 
among local resource users is needed to support collective solutions to 
NRM problems that remain unaddressed despite their negative livelihood 
consequences. 
•  Extension and development organizations must consider the political 
dimensions of natural resource management in terms of winner and losers 
from any given development intervention, and the existence of diverse 
interests and stakes on any given issue. They must then learn to work 
explicitly with these political dynamics to foster more equitable solutions 
to development and NRM challenges through stakeholder identification, 
negotiation support (to identify socially-optimal NRM solutions and 
mechanisms for equitable benefits capture), and socially-disaggregated 
monitoring of interventions.  38 
•  There is also an urgent need for NGOs, local government and other 
development actors to get involved in natural resource policy formulation 
and implementation processes. This is due to the intimate association 
between negotiation support, technological innovation, and rules and 
regulations on NRM, and the urgent need to engage their facilitation skills 
in fostering more equitable and participatory natural resource governance 
processes.  
•  Fostering collective action where it is absent in addressing felt community 
needs requires informal negotiation support, formal by-law reforms, and 
forms of enforcement adapted to local social realities. Participatory by-law 
reforms create stakeholder buy-in, which reduces the cost of enforcement 
and reduces ambiguity. Neither formal nor informal mechanism would be 
fully effective without the other.  
•  The external agent, whether an NGO, community-based organization or 
local government, bore the transaction costs of organizing collective 
action. The role of these actors involves both information provision and 
time spent in organizing and facilitating community events. 
Policy and research implications 
The following implications for policy may be derived from this research: 
•  Policymakers must seek ways to build upon the strengths of local 
institutions and the crucial social support functions they provide, in 
particular for women, the poor, and other marginalized groups. They must 
also seek ways to facilitate the participation of poorer households in 
development by assisting them in bridging the assets gap hindering their 
ability to invest. This might include strategies and policies for linking 
technology dissemination with low-risk forms of credit, and diversification 
of assets for the poor rather than the current policies of enterprise 
specialization.  
•  While many national natural resource policies exist, many are not 
followed, leaving a governance gap in many highland communities. 
Participatory by-law reforms suggest an interest in improved natural 
resource governance among local residents. More attention should be paid 
to building the soft skills and processes required to create community 
buy-in for good governance (such as stakeholder identification, 
facilitation, and negotiation support), and for enforcement mechanisms 
that are effective, while providing alternatives where policies restrict 
livelihoods options. 
•  The partitioning of mandates between research, extension, and law 
enforcement agencies—and failure by most organizations to consider the 
role of negotiation support in fostering socially-optimal development 
outcomes and policies—causes these issues to be treated separately and 
important synergies to be lost. Mechanisms and incentives for institutional 
cooperation toward more equitable and negotiated solutions to NRM are 
sorely needed. While local residents can formulate NRM by-laws that 
address their own felt needs, by-law enforcement by communities 
themselves is a challenge as it involves sanctioning friends and relatives. 39 
Throughout eastern Africa, communities demand for local government to 
play a role in the enforcement of by-laws generated by communities 
themselves. This should be taken into account in the process of 
decentralization and local government reforms in the region so that 
participatory governance processes can be institutionalized in the region. 
Part of this process will require capacity-building of government actors 
themselves in the facilitation of—and responsiveness to—bottom-up 
decision-making. 
•  While empirical research on the institutional aspects of development has 
advanced our understanding of the pitfalls of development practice and 
the characteristics of local institutions, two fundamental gaps remain. The 
first is in ensuring widespread access to lessons learnt among 
development practitioners to improve their practice. The second is the 
need to move beyond the identification of problems to the identification of 
viable solutions (good practice) through the coupling of empirical and 
action-oriented research. Managers of research and development 
institutions must actively seek ways to bridge these two research 
traditions with practice to generate more equitable and effective 
development support strategies.  40 
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